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REMARNS ON SOME RECENT PENNSYLVANIA CASES.
It is an oft repeated observation, that in respect to real estate, it
is of small importance what the law is, so long as it is definitely
settled and rigidly adhered to. No matter how artificial, and even
irration'd, a rule of property may be, it can do, in the long run, lit-
tle harm, provided its existence be once absolutely fixed. Nay,
even if its operation could be shown, upon considerations of abstract
policy, to be positively injurious, still its very certainty provides a
remedy, by suggesting the means of its evasion. In short, whether
it be a beacon to guide or a rock to be shunned, when it is clearly
marked upon the chart, no real danger need be feared.
For the ordinary business of life, this certainty and fixedness in
the rules of law are matters of positive necessity; peculiarly so,
indeed, here, where land has become so much an article of com-
merce. As such its value is entirely dependent on the real or sup-
posed security of title. Any doubt on that score will throw the
most desirable property out of the market. This is especially the
case where there is a fluctuation of decision on a point of frequent
occurrence in the derivation of title. Counsel will not advise, nor
clients buy, where the soundness of the advice or the security of the
purchase must depend on the determination of such a point. Pro-
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perty is thus struck as it -were by a legal blight. But it is not in
the dealings in the market place alone that the injurious effect of
this uncertainty is felt. In the division of estates and in family
arrangements it operates in quite as hurtful a manner. It is in the
present a sure incentive to bitter litigation among those who above
all ought to be kept in harmonious relations, and in the future tends
to produce the disruption of settlements made in good faith, and
on the basis of which marriages are formed and offspring reared.
From whatever point of view they can be regarded, decisions which
unsettle the law on questions of importance must be deeply deplored,
and ought to be the subject of a general and earnest protest.
These remarks may seem trite and scarcely deserving of the
space which they occupy here ; but, unfortunately, they do not
appear always to have been kept before the minds of judges, other-
wise of great learning and logical force. It cannot be denied, how-
ever much it may be regretted, that for this reason there are cases
,on the law of real estate to be found in recent volumes of the Penn-
zylvania Reports, which have by no means given general satisfac-
tion to the bar in this State. We wish to speak with the greatest
.respect and deference, but it is impossible not to see that in
several instances old rules have been shaken or abandoned, and
-established precedents neglected, in favor of newer theories of juris-
prudence, and of doctrines which had not previously been considered
as a part of our law. In making this assertion we believe that we do
mo injustice to the bench, for such seems to be the expressed inten-
tion in several of the decisions to which we refer.
It is not our purpose to enter into any criticism upon the points
.actually decided in any of those cases. Once determined it may be
as well that they should stand, however much we may regret their
ilecision.
"Let what is broken so reman.
The Gods are hard to reconcile."
Our intention at present is simply to offer a few brief remarks on
some dicta contained in two late decisions, which have been the
subject of considerable comment among lawyers here :-we mean
'Williams vs. Leech, 4 Casey, 89, and Price vs. Taylor, Id. 104.
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These cases are not, indeed, very recent, but the doctrines advanced
in them have not yet lost the freshness of novelty, nor have they
been qualified or withdrawn in any subsequent decision.
Before the case of Price vs. Taylor, it had been the undoubted
opinion of lawyers in Pennsylvania that estates tail descended to the
heir at common law, there as in England. It had been so expressly
decided under an early act of assembly, to be hereafter noticed.
Many estates had been settled, many titles passed on the faith of
the law having still remained the same. Property of really immense
value in the city of Philadelphia alone, is now and has been held
under entails, particularly in the Penn and other English families,
-which had always been treated as so descending, and many sales
made by the supposed tenant in tail for the time being. To one
had raised, or even hinted any doubt on the point, so far as we are
aware. In Price vs. Taylor, however, while it is not expressly
decided, nor indeed in any way necessary to the decision of the
cause, it is for the first time suggested that estates tail descend here
according to the provisions of the intestate laws; and this sugges-
tion is made is such strong terms as to leave a decided impression
on the mind that it was intended as a timely warning of what the
court would decide when the question actually arose, and not as a
mere speculative disceursw on an abstract subject. Considering it
in this light, we must respectfully say, that even if it were correct
in principle, we would earnestly deprecate such a decision at this
late day, because of the great damage to titles which would ensue,
and still more, if as we expect to show, it could not really be
supported in law.
The first permanent provision on the subject of descents in Pennsyl-
vania is contained in the act of 1705, entitled "An Act for the better
settlement of intestates' estates." That act regulated only lineal de-
scent, establishing therein equality of division, except that the eldest
son got a double share. In all other cases, subject to a provision for
the widow, the heir at common law took. The particular section of
the act in which this provision occurs, reads as follows: "The sur-
plusage, or remaining portion of the intestate's lands, &c., not sold
or ordered to be sold by virtue of this act, and not otherwise limited
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marriage settlement, shall be divided between the intestate's
widow," &c.
That act continued in force till 1794, being modified in the mean-
time only by the acts of 1748 and 1764, which provided for the
case of lineal descendants dying under age and without issue.
Under this act of 1705, the question arose about the year 1793,
in the case of Goodright vs. .Aorningstar, 1 Yeates, 315, as to the
descent of estates tail. It was argued upon almost exactly the
same grounds as have since been urged in Price vs. Taylor, that such
estates were within the act. But the court, without hearing the
opposite side, decided at once that the heir at common law took,
observing, "That it was too late now to stir the point, whatever
reason there might have been for it in the first instance. The in-
variable opinion of lawyers, since the act of 1705, has been that
lands entailed descended according to the course of the common law,
and it has been understood generally that it had been so adjudged
in-e6rly times. All the common recoveries which have been suf-
fered by the heirs of donees in tail have been conformable to that
principle ; to unsettle so many titles at this late day would be pro-
ductive of endless confusion." "Our act of 1705 only regulates the
descent of lands among the children where the father is seized thereof,
and might dispose of them by deed or will. It leaves other cases as
they were at common law."
In the subsequent case of Jenk's Lessee vs. Backhouse, 1 Binn. 96,
it was decided, further, that trust estates were not within the act;
and in the course of his opinion, Judge Yeates, who was a most
accomplished lawyer, said : "In the case of an estate tail after the
death of the tenant in tail, it has been determined at York Nisi Prius
that his heir at common law shall take the land thus entailed. He
claims it as said per formam doni; yet as to the purpose of taking
he is considered the heir of his father. The strong ground of the
decision I take to have been, that it had been the uniform received
opinion of the profession that such a case was not within the true
.spirit of the intestate laws, that many estates had been held under
it, and that it would be highly dangerous at this time to impeach
the dbctrine."
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The act of 1794 then came to abolish the preference formerly
given to the eldest son, and to establish, in certain specified cases,
a scheme of descent different from the common law. That act
is styled "An Act directing the descent of intestates' real estates,"
&c., and the prefatory language is as follows: "The remaining
part of any lands, tenements, hereditaments and personal estate of
any person deceased not sold or disposed of by will, shall be divided
and enjoined (enjoyed) as follows." There were supplementary acts
in 1798 and afterwards, intended to supply casus omissi, but nothing
was enacted in them affecting this point. The general rule was fre-
quently held under these statutes to be, that the heir at common
law took in all cases not specially provided for. It does not seem
to be asserted in -Price vs. Taylor that any difference was made by
them in regard to estates tail. Indeed, the language of the court
in G odrighl vs. M11orningstar, is quite as applicable to these acts
as to the act of 1705.
The act of 1833 was drawn by the revisers of the code of Penn-
sylvania, all men of great learning, and thoroughly acquainted with
the law and usages of Pennsylvania. That act is entitled "1 An Act
relating to the descent and distribution of the estates of intestates." Its
prefatory words are : "The real and personal estate of a decedent
remaining after payment of debts and legal charges, and which shall
not have been sold, or disposed of by will, or otherwise limited by mar-
riage settlement, shall be divided and enjoined (enjoyed) as follows."
It then proceeds to make provision for all possible cases of descent,
enumerated as far as convenient, and otherwise covered by the
sweeping expression "next of kin." There is a clause, indeed,
which, after reciting that whereas it was the true intent and meaning
of the act that the heir at common law should not take in any case to
the exclusion of other heirs or kindred standing in the same degree of
consanguinity to the intestate, declares that in every case which might
arise, not expressly provided for by the act, real as well as the personal
estate should pass to and be enjoyed by the next of kin of the intestate,
without regard to the ancestor or other relative, &c. But it is not pre-
tended that this has any bearing on the question in hand, nor indeed
could it. It extends, of course, only to cases within the purview of the
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statute. The words still refer to " the intestate" only, i. e. to that
class to whom the prefatory words above cited were meant to apply.
The actual operation of the clause is only in respect to cases not
expressly provided for by the statute, and hence not to lineal descent,
which is the peculiar characteristic of estates tail. And finally, it is
well known that it was introduced only to prevent the possibility of
the casus omissi under the earlier acts which had made fresh legis-
lation necessaryfrom time to time, as such omissions were discovered.
Now, on the point before us it ' is difficult to see what difference
there is between the acts of 1705, 1794, and 1883. The language
is almost identical. They all equally point to property over which
the decedent would otherwise have had a power of testamentary
disposition, as that to which their provisions were to apply. In-
deed, the very word intestate implies this. If any thing, the terms
of the act of 1833 are the strongest to exclude estates tail. The
words "remaining after the payment of debts and legal charges,"
are peculiarly significant, for whatever else may be asserted, it cer-
tainly cannot be contended that an estate tail is liable for the debts
of the tenant in tail. If there be any virtue in precedents, the op-
posite was expressly decided in -Elliott vs. Pearsoll, 8 W. & S. 38.
Further, the act of 1883, after exhausting all conceivable cases of
descent by consanguinity, ends them with the provision : "In default
of all such knowm heirs or kindred, widow or surviving husband, as
aforesaid, the real and personal estate of such intestate shall go to
and be vested in the commonwealth by escheat." Unless we are
prepared to admit that estates tail escheat upon failure of the issue
in tail, irrespective of the rights of the reversioner or remainder
man, we must in the first instance consider that the act was intended
to apply only to estates in fee simple.
As the revisers moreover prefixed to the acts prepared by them a
short explanation of their provisions, always carefully indicating
therein, as was their duty, any novel sections or clauses which they
had introduced, we might expect to find in their Report on the
intestate law some indication of their intention to recommend such
an important change as that act is supposed to have effected.
Surely they never meant to introduce it into our legislation, in dis-
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guise as it were. But we have read the Report carefully, and fail
to discover the slightest indication of such an intention. The whole
tenor of their observations is entirely removed from any such sup-
position. On the contrary, we know it as matter of fact to have
been the intention of the revisers to leave the law in regard to
estates tail and trust estates exactly as it had been, and that the
introductory words of the act, which we have before quoted, were
copied so closely from the earlier acts for the very reason that they
had received a judicial interpretation in Goodriglht vs. lforning-
star, and Jenk's Lessee vs. Backouse. But let this go for what
it is worth. It is sufficient that the printed explanations of the
revisers maintain an expressive silence as to any designed alteration
of the law. We are therefore at liberty, or rather are forced to
fall back on the very safe and rational maxim that statutes in
pari materia are to be construed together, and that analogous
words therein are to receive the same interpretation.
Now let us turn to the grounds on which the dicta in Price vs.
Taylor are based. These are thrown into the form of four con-
nected propositions, and so numbered.
The first of these is thus stated:
"1. The reason why estates tail descended to the eldest son under
our old laws of descent, was because the descent of such estates was
not provided for under our old statutes, and therefore the common
law alone furnished the rule for them."
True: but the same reasoning applies to the act of 1833.
" Our old statutes of descent provided only for the descent of
lands which the decedent could dispose of by deed or will, and
estates tail did not then fall within that category. The act of
1799 changed this, and allowed estates tail to be sold and conveyed
by deed in a very simple way."
These words, "dispose of by deed or will," are not found in any
of the acts; they are the loosely reported language of the court in
Goodrigla vs. 3orningstar. The words of the act of 1705 are, "not
sold or ordered to be sold by virtue of this act, and not otherwise
limited by marriage settlement." I The meaning of these words
IThis is the exact punctuation of Bradford's editions of 1714 and of 1728, of tha
of Franklin in 1742, and of that of Miller in 1762.
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.aca be better understood by Teferring to the immediately preceding
sections, or rather section, which enacts that "If any person or
.persons shall die intestate, being owners of lands or tenements at
the time of their death, and leave lawful issue to survive them, but
not a sufficient personal estate to pay their just debts, &c.," then
that it should be lawful for the administrators to sell for payment
of debts, &c. ; with a proviso, "That no lands or tenements, con-
tUried in any marriage settlement, shall by virtue of this act be
sold or disposed, contrary to the form and effect of such settle-
ment." Then follows the clause enacting that "the surplusage or
remaining part of the intestate's lands, &c., not sold or ordered to
be sold, &c.," which we have before quoted. The conclusion of the
court in 1 Yeates must therefore have been derived from the gene-
ral tenor of the act, from the use of the word owner, and from the
fact of thp act applying in its terms only to the estates of intestates.
They were construing general, not specific language.
Estates tail, moreover, could be sold and conveyed before the act
of 1799 as well as after. The object of that act was not to render
them for the first time alienable, but as its preamble declares, to
avoid the "inconvenience" and "heavy expense" of common reco-
veries. But such estates could not then, nor can they now, be dis-
posed of by will, and therefore are not within the purview of "1intes-
tate" laws. They are not properly in honis of the decedent at the
time of his death. The heir in tail takes as purchaser, not by
descent; performam doni, not by operation of law. How could
an estate in tail male be divided -equally under our act of 1833 ?
The true distinction lies here, not in any question as to the aliena-
bility of estates tail, which has existed for centuries. The whole
matter, indeed, appears in a very clear light, when we remember
that the acts under consideration are not "statutes of descent," in
the abstract, a phrase which involves, with great respect, a petitio
principii, but simply as they style themselves, acts "relating to the
flescent and distribution of the estates of intestates," or the like.
Thus leaving the descent of other kinds of estates at common law.
We are for these reasons unable to follow the court to the con-
clusion that:
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"Therefore the new law of intestates of 1833 expressly includes
such estates, because it declares the line of descent of all lands
which the intestate might have sold in his lifetime or disposed of by
will."
The words last italicised are merely an inference from the act of
1883, not its very words. The word "sold," in that act, as in the
act of 1705, means sold by the administrator, &c., under order of
the court, not sold by the intestate himself. It would scarcely
be very rational legislation to provide that the "remaining estate"
of an intestate, except such as he did not own at the time of his
death, should be divided, &c., which would only be another mode of
putting it. The revisers, in their anxiety to continue the words
both of the act of 1705 and 1794, have left the sentence a little
obscure, at first reading; but the preceding words, "remaining
after payment of debts and legal charges," show that they meant
their language to apply only to a period at or after the death of the
intestate. And when we turn back to the provisions of the act of
1705, the difficulty is entirely cleared up.
2. The next proposition of the court in Price vs. Taylor is to this
effect.
The statute of wills of 1833, passed on the same day with the
intestate law, which provides that in case of a devise to a child,
there shall be no lapse by his or her death in the testator's lifetime,
goes on the principle of entailment, and yet there the descent is
according to our law of lineal descent.
The answer to this is:
(I.) This provision is a mere repetition of an act of 1810, and
therefore its present coincidence in date with the intestate act is
purely accidental.
(2.) A devise to a child in tail, which would otherwise lapse just
as a devise in fee, is equally within this clause of the wills act, which
merely provides that "such devise shall be good and available in
favor of such surviving issue, with like effect as if such devisee had
survived the testator," and says nothipg at all about the "law of
lineal descent." So that the argument proves too much.
(3.) The act of 1705, in providing for a descent to grandchildren
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and their lineal descendants, in the case of the death of a child in
the lifetime of the intestate, goes quite as much on the principle of
entailment, and yet under it Goodright vs. MZforningstar was
decided.
3. We now come to the 3d ground taken in Price vs. Taylor,
which is in substance that,
The judicial adoption of the law of primogeniture has ceased to
have any support in our laws and customs. Therefore we cannot
any longer presume that by general words of entailment, a descent
according to the English law was intended.
There is, no doubt, force in this; and the intentions of tes-
tators are likewise constantly frustrated by the construction which
the courts put-too frequently, we think-upon the words "dying
without issue." But there seems to be no way of getting over the
rule that technical words must have their technical effect, however
much it may defeat the suspected intention of a testator in either
case. We are satisfied that most people in this State are aware
that express estates tail go to the eldest son ; and in the absence
of any legislative declaration to the contrary, we suppose that
they are willing that such should be the law. We are on the con-
trary, indeed, inclined to suspect that the real difficulty lies in the
ignorance of people at large as to the effect of the constructive
estates tail, which have become of late years so prevalent; and that
the wiser course will be found to be to have followed the English
decisions in the opposite direction.
4. Finally, we are told that this construction would make the law
perfectly simple and homogeneous. "And thus," say the court,
"we might hope to have wills of this nature easily construed by
parties and their counsel, without the necessity which now exists of
always resorting to the courts for an authoritative interpretation of
them before making or accepting title under them."
We do not at all doubt that if the Legislature had chosen to
declare that, for the future, estates tail should descend according to
the intestate laws, it would have been a judicious change, and that
simplicity and uniformity in the laws of descent are very desirable
things. Such legislation could injure no one, and would be per-
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fectly constitutional. But we do most strenuously object to the
introduction of such a change by judicial decision, for that must
operate upon the past, and to the destruction of many titles taken in
good faith and for valuable consideration. It certainly would be
neither right nor constitutional to do this merely to simplify the law
and to enable counsel to construe wills with ease. The latter object
would be better effected by raising the standard of legal education,
and the former by a general revision and codification of our statutes,
which has been long needed.
Nor, we greatly fear, would the change, if effected, whether by
court or legislature, materially lighten the labors of judges in the diffi-
cult task of the interpretation of wills. While language is so imper-
fect, and testators are so unskilled in the use of words and so ignorant
of the effect of their dispositions, it would be indulging in a vain hope
to expect to make that task an easy one by any short-hand process.
We believe that the chief trouble in this respect arises from the fact
that most men have but a vague idea of what they wish, or possess
not sufficient analytic power to adapt their wishes to a complex and
changing future. But be this as it may, we fail to see how the mere
alteration of the course of descent of an estate tail created by will
can facilitate the construction of that will. In England estates tail
general descend just as fee simples do, and the desired simpli-
city and homogeneity have always existed. Yet courts there find the
same difficulty with the construction of wills; the same questions as
to the words " dying without issue," on the rule in Shelley's case,
and the other Chinese puzzles of the common law, arise and perplex
judges, as here. The revisers of the New York code had gotten as
near absolute simplicity in their system of law as seems possible in
civilized society, and yet we believe the courts in that State are as
much afflicted with testamentary cases as before. In short, the
whole difficulty lies with human nature, and not with the rules
of law.
These are the propositions stated by the court in Price vs. Taylor,
as the reasons on which the suggestion of the court is expressly
based. There is another argument incidentally used, however, in
respect to which a single observation may be made in conclusion. It
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i- said by the court that estates tail, in respect to Gavelkind and
Borough English land in England, descend to the customary heir,
and not the heir at common law. This is so; but the same argu-
ment was used in Goodright vs. Morningstar, and met with the con-
clusive answer from the court in that case, that such descent was as
much a part of the particular custom as the peculiar descent of the
fee simple lands.
For these reasons we must respectfully submit and urge that the
dicta in Price vs. Taylor are based upon a misapprehension of the
law, and that they ought not to be allowed to ripen into a decision.
We now pass to the consideration of the case of Williams vs.
Leech, upon which, however, as we have already exceeded the space
we intended to occupy, we can say but little here. Till the decision
in that case, it was the unquestioned opinion of the profession, and
it had been often so held, that a devise to A for life, remainder to
his children and their heirs, with or without a devise over on failure
of issue, was not, as regards the estate of A., within the rule in
Shelley's case. It is a very common limitation; indeed, we have
seen but few wills without it, and so the title to property of the
value of many millions, perhaps, depends on the correctness of that
opinion.
In this case of Williams vs. Leech, in construing a will contain-
ing clauses in substance of that character, the learned judge who
delivered the opinion of the court said:
"We have suggested in a late case, Price vs. Taylor, that since
the act of 1833 of wills and descents, an estate tail general may
descend according to our own law of lineal descents. If this be so,
a devise to children to take distributively, is a valid definition of
lineal descent, and therefore of entailment. Then the rule would
apply that an estate granted to one for life, with remainder to his
lineal heirs, is an estate tail ; the superadded words, ' and their
.heirs,' go for nothing. They were necessary under the English
law, when children took by purchase, and not as heirs of the body,
else they would have had but a life estate. Here they zre heirs of
th.e body when taking equally, and we should have little difficulty in
regarding-this as an estate tail, were~it not that the two limitations are
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altogelher a devise to the general heirs of the first taker. Children,
being as good a word of lineal descent, is equivalent to issue, and
this devise may be put into the very language most usual in creating
an estate tail, thus-devise to A. for life, remainder to his issue, and
in default of issue over."
These propositions were, however, admitted not to be necessary
to the decision of the cause, and the case actually went on another
ground.
We confess that we are unable to follow the reasoning which we
have just set down. We had hitherto supposed that the rule in
Shelley's case did not apply to limitations in fee or tail, after a life
estate, to the "children," "1 the sons," or "daughters" of the first
taker, or even "heirs," when clearly used as a mere descriptio per-
sonarun. That our intestate laws, when defining the persons who
should take as heirs, to be "children," "grand-children," "brothers
and sisters," "uncles and aunts," thereby intended to make them,
when used in wills, words of limitation instead of words of purchase,
was, -we humbly submit, never before imagined, any more than that
they became so in England because they were used in Blackstone's
Canons of descent. The fact that the person to whom a devise in
fee is made by a specific designation is also the heir of the first
taker, has been constantly held not to have any effect in giving a
fee to the latter. So where the limitations expressly exhaust the
whole series of lineal heirs of the tenant for life, as in the case of a
devise to A. for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail,
remainder to his daughters as tenants in common in tail, which is a
very common form of settlement, the rule in Shelley's case does not
operate in England. In the well known case of Goodtitle vs. Her-
ring, 1 East, 264, this was held, even where the devise was in the
first instance to the heirs male of the hod1, of the tenant for life,
those words being subsequently qualified by the use of the word
sons. Unless, then, we are to abandon all precedent and analogy,
we cannot consider "children" here, on a devise to them in fee, as
taking in the character of heirs, and if not, then plainly they do not
take in the quality of heirs.
There is no doubt that under the acts of 1703 and 1794, respec-
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tively, on such a devise to children they took as purchasers,'
and yet under those acts, as well as that of 1833, lineal descent to
children and grand-children nominatim was provided for. What
difference, then, is created by the latter statute? Neither in the
words of the act, nor in the language of the revisers, do we find a
single word to indicate an intention to alter so well established a rule
of construction.
When the court say, in the words italicised above, that "a devise
to children to take distributively is a valid definition of lineal descent,
and therefore of entailment," they seem-we wish to speak with
great respect-to have become entangled in a mesh of abstract
phrases. If it be meant that a devise to A for life, remainder to
his children in fee, is a valid definition of lineal descent, we cannot
agree to it, because, 1st, children do Dot constitute the whole of
lineal descendants, and 2d, the heirs of a man's children are not by
any means always his lineal descendants, or even his heirs. And
further, if it were so, we cannot admit that a "valid definition of
lineal descent" is necessarily also that of entailment. The latter
implies a design to prevent alienation so long as the line of lineal
descent continues, whereas a devise to children in fee implies a design
to give them an absolute power of disposition. On what ground
the court summarily decides that "the superadded words ' and their
heirs' go for nothing," we do not see. They most clearly indicate
an intention to make the children a new stock of descent, and surely
there is nothing illegal in that. Such superadded words are rejected,
it is true, where the previous language has already established a
clear estate tail, but never before were they rejected in order to
make an estate tail out of that which would not be so otherwise.
I is not necessary to discuss this matter further, for we are sure
that further considerationi will convince the court that the novel doc-
trine of Williams vs. Leech cannot be supported. We would, how-
ever, in conclusion, desire to press on their attention again the fact
that conveyances from children under such limitations have been
constantly taken, that property to a really incalculable value is
now so held, and that if the doctrine of Williams vs. Leech be cor-
I See Elliott vs. Pazson, 2 W. & S. 418; Stewart vs. Zenower, 7 W. & S. 295.
